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Sherlock's Admonition: Vindicatory Contempts as Criminal
Actions for Purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 362
Amir Shachmurove*
"Circumstantial evidence is a very tricky thing," answered Holmes
thoughtfully. "It may seem to point very straight to one thing, but if
you shift your own point of view a little, you may find it pointing in
an equally uncompromising manner to something entirely
different. "1
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1. INTRODUCTION
A court's power to hold a litigant in contempt is an ancient power,
recognized as an inherent right of all Anglo-Saxon tribunals far back
in the ivied annals of English history2 and in the United States' early
days.3 Of a more recent vintage, § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
(the "Code") 4 stays "the commencement or continuation.., of a judi-
cial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement
of the case under ... title [11]" upon a debtor's filing of a voluntary
bankruptcy petition or the entering of a court's order for relief in an
involuntary case. 5 Section 362(b)(1) exempts from the operation of
this potent stay "the commencement or continuation of a criminal ac-
tion or proceeding against the debtor. ' ' 6 Customarily, so as to secure
the Code's bedrock policies, the exceptions in § 362(b) are narrowly
construed, the writ of § 362(a) broadly read.
For more than two decades, a debate has raged over what to make
of vindicatory contempts, a class of ostensibly civil contempt orders 7
intended to punish a debtor for his or her defiance of prior judicial
2. Ronald Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH, U. L. Q. 1, 8-9 (1961);
see also, e.g., Francis D. Dibble, Jr., Note, Contempt of Court: Go Directly to Jail. Do Not Pass
Go. Do Not Collect Your Constitutional Rights, 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 517, 523-24 (1973); Ron-
ald Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 283 (1962-1963).
3. Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. 38, 44, (1822); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32,
34 (1812).
4. The specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 inclu-
sive, are referred to in this article as "Section _" or "§ " unless otherwise noted.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2014). Section 362(a)(1) also applies to "[a] proceeding ... to re-
cover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under ... title
[11]." Id. Because of the inclusion of the disjunctive "or" prior to "to recover," § 362(a)(1) is
properly construed as referring to two separate classes of proceedings. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1979); see also United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 (2013) (citing
Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).
7. Technically, the term "contempt" is a shortened version of the more formal phrase "con-
tempt of court" and refers to the conduct being punished. The term is also commonly used to
refer to the judicial order sanctioning the relevant misbehavior. In this article, unless otherwise
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orders and issued pre-petition by a state court.8 Because § 362(a)(1)
applies to all judicial actions and proceedings and § 362(b)(1) excepts
only criminal matters, many courts hold that contempts not issued
during the course of a proceeding to enforce a penal law must be
stayed. The plain language, they contend, allows no other construc-
tion, Congress' purpose manifest in the capacious language of § 362(a)
and its plenary authority over "the subject of Bankruptcies" 9 dating to
June 21, 1788.10 Others disagree, offering two justifications for recog-
nizing an exception to § 362(a) for vindicatory contempts. First, Con-
gress could not have actually intended to strip state courts of their
ability to exercise such an ancient and inherent power on a debtor
post-petition. Second, the Code is not designed to protect debtors
from the consequences of the kind of obdurate conduct punished by
these contempts. Even within this majority, there is no consensus.
Some courts seem to define vindicatory contempts as criminal,
thereby bringing them within the ambit of § 362(b)(1), but they do so
inconsistently and often apologetically."1 Far more courts simply
evade the distinction between "criminal" and "civil."' 12 After more
than thirty years, with the Code giving no definition to the critical
term "criminal" in § 362(b)(1), the case law regarding the applicability
of § 362(a)(1) and (b)(1) to vindicatory contempts is still confused and
the courts remain in persistent discord.
Relying on the widely accepted principles of interpretation rarely
applied with any thoroughness in these cases, this article pinpoints
where these courts err and how this debate must finally be settled in
three substantive parts. Part II tells the stereotypical tale, culled from
a string of similar cases, of a vindicatory contempt as applied to a new
debtor. Part III outlines the proper methods of Code interpretation
noted, the terms "contempt," "vindicatory contempt," and "order" refer to the order itself, not
the specific misconduct being penalized.
8. A further divide exists between direct and indirect contempt. Indirect contempts punish
behavior occurring out of court while direct contempts chastise for conduct that transpired in the
issuing court's presence. Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994). Whether a contempt
is direct or indirect has no direct bearing on whether it is or is not vindicatory. See Parkhurst v.
U.S. Dep't of Educ., 9 Fed. Appx. 900, 904-05 (10th Cir. 2001).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
10. On that summer day, a ninth state-New Hampshire-ratified the United States Constitu-
tion, establishing it as the law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VII. The Bankruptcy Clause was
barely discussed during the Constitutional Convention. Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional
Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 527 (1996). Possibly as a result, members of the
founding generation espoused very different views of the Bankruptcy Clause's purpose and grant
of authority. Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 319, 340-41 (2013).
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra Part III.C.
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and dissects the underwhelming reasoning that plagues the seminal
cases, rendering their interpretations of § 362(a) and (b) and the at-
tendant categorization of these contempts dubious. In the first part of
Part IV, this article first identifies a definitional source for "criminal"
that encompasses vindicatory contempts-federal common law-and
thereafter shows how a non-statutory exception for these contempts is
defended by more than a mere assertion of presumed congressional
intent. Part IV's second half specifies the four factors critical to the
determination of whether a particular contempt order is vindicatory, a
summation useful for courts and litigants alike. By its end, having de-
lineated how to balance the relatively neoteric Code 13 against a time-
worn prerogative, 14 this Article achieves more than the elucidation of
a single disputed term and the classification of a single type of judicial
action, for in so doing, it simultaneously explicates a model of con-
struction applicable to all Code sections. 15
II. A CONTEMPTIBLE PROBLEM16
Prepetition, an asset recovery firm (the "Plaintiff") sues a natural
defendant (the "Defendant" or "Debtor") and his three wholly con-
trolled entities (collectively, the "Defendants"), jointly and severally,
for money damages, pre-judgment interest, and costs. Within months,
the Defendants lose on every count. Although no such finding is ever
made, business analysts suspect the artificial defendants to be the nat-
ural Defendant's alter egos. On September 9, 2012, the state court
enters a final judgment against the Defendants. As permitted by the
relevant state's procedural rules regarding post-judgment discovery,
after the Plaintiff makes a formal request, the state court orders the
Defendant to complete and tender several financial affidavits. 17
13. The Code became effective on October 1, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978); In re Zweibahmer, 25 B.R. 453,457 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1982).
14. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *286 (describing the courts' "competent au-
thority to secure their administration from disobedience and contempt" as resulting "from the
first principles of judicial establishments, and must be an inseparable attendant upon every supe-
rior tribunal") [hereinafter "BLACKSTONE"].
15. For example, when defining the term "a bona fide purchaser of real property" in
§ 544(a)(3), one court endorsed the method of interpretation espoused in this article. In re
Asher, 488 B.R. 58 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (construing 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2012)).
16. The scenario summarized in this part draws on many of the contempt cases analyzed in
this article.
17. E.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 69(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.560; TEX. R. Civ. P. 500.9(b). Post-
judgment discovery is permitted under the federal rules as well. FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2); FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7069 (making the hypothetical above applicable to adversary proceedings under
the Code).
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In subsequent months, the Defendant proffers not a single form,
and the state court responds with a series of unquestionably civil con-
tempts. In November 2012, the state court orders the Defendant to
pay a specific sum in sanctions ($1,250) within ten days. When the
Defendant fails to do so, on January 10, 2013, the court issues another
order compelling him to appear before it and show cause why he
should not be subjected to a terse contempt. On that wintry day, the
Defendant does not appear, though his counsel submits a notice of
compliance. The state court thereupon issues an order of contempt
and a warrant for commitment on January 21, 2013. Pursuant to this
third order, the Defendant has the option to purge the contempt by
paying to the Plaintiff rather than the court sanctions of $3,156, the
sheriff's fee for the warrant's execution, and the Plaintiff's legal fees.
The Defendant fails to pay and on July 21, 2013, the state court issues
a fourth order, placing the Defendant under house arrest on his own
recognizance until the fine is paid or a notice of compliance is filed.
Finally, a few hastily filed forms trickle into the Plaintiff's hands; to
excuse the missing plentitude, the Defendant offers a litany.
On December 5, 2013, with the Defendant still resistant, the state
court issues its final order, leading to the Defendant's immediate ar-
rest. The sheriff will now keep the Defendant incarcerated until the
latter finally supplies corrected versions of the forms previously re-
quested by the Plaintiff and demanded by the court. In addition, this
order requires the Defendant to remit $6,000 in compliance with the
July order, to pay the Plaintiff's sizable attorney's fees, and to pay the
fee for this order's execution by county sheriff's office. As before, the
Defendant is to pay the fines and fees Plaintiff. As the order specifies
in its final paragraph, the payment of these sums and provision of the
requested forms would lead to the Defendant's release, but the mon-
ies owed would never be reduced. The final order is never branded
"criminal," and the scanty record does not indicate whether it af-
forded the Defendant the due process protections mandated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' At the time, no
one takes notice of these oversights.
18. If a federal court had issued the contempt, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment would apply. With only slight modification, due to the fact that federal courts partly derive
their contempt powers from statute, this article's analysis applies regardless of whether the Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment governs. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2014); see Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 169 (1958) ("The generality of this language suggests that § 17[, the predecessor to 18 U.S.C.
§ 401,] was intended to do no more than expressly attribute to the federal judiciary those powers
to punish for contempt possessed by English courts at common law."), overruled on other
grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Maynard v. United States, 23 F.2d 141, 143
2014]
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On January 26, 2014, the Defendant unexpectedly files a voluntary
Chapter 7 petition. Perfectly eligible under § 109, the Defendant be-
comes the Debtor. a9 Within five days, his counsel files a motion pro-
pounding one argument: because the final contempt order is patently
civil on its face, § 362(a)(1) stays the order's further enforcement, and
the Debtor is entitled to immediate release. 20
III. TOOLS OF INTERPRETATION
A. Tricky Words in Governing Texts: "Civil," "Criminal,"
and "Contempt"
In relevant part, § 362(a) stays "the commencement or continuation
... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title."'21 Self-executing, 22 the auto-
matic stay is broad and far-reaching, 23 imposing on non-debtor parties
an affirmative duty of compliance upon a debtor's voluntary filing.24
Per this subsection's unadorned language, it is irrelevant if formal rec-
ognition of the stay's applicability to a certain action and to a particu-
lar creditor occurs long after the petition date.25 The action is
reckoned void or voidable so long as the factual predicates encoded in
(D.C. Cir. 1927) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 401 does not affect the courts' inherent power to
punish for contempt).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2014). The analysis in this article applies regardless of whether the
debtor is an individual, corporation, or municipality.
20. A filing so motivated conceivably raises a question of bad faith under § 707(a). Id.
§ 707(a); In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (6th Cir. 1991) ("A lack of good faith ... has been
recognized in a number of bankruptcy cases as a valid cause of dismissal under § 707(a)." (col-
lecting cases)). That possibility is not the subject of this article, though one must always be
weary of denying statutory relief to a qualified individual on the basis of an inquiry too often
"employed as a loose cannon which is to be pointed in the direction of a debtor whose values do
not coincide precisely with those of the court." Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d
829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Latmer, 82 B.R. 354, 364 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1988)); see also
In re Victoria Ltd. P'ship, 187 B.R. 54, 56-62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (tracing the history of the
good faith doctrine and concluding that it "is an amorphous gestalt, devoid of reasoning and
impenetrable to understanding").
21. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., 502 U.S. 32,
39 (1991).
22. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 560 (1990); Jacks v. Wells Fargo (In
re Jacks), 642 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
23. Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992); see also ACandS, Inc. v. Travelers
Cas. & Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The scope of the automatic stay is broad and
covers all proceedings against a debtor, including arbitration.").
24. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 1982); S. Dallas
Water Auth. v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am., 767 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1297 (S.D. Ala. 2011).
25. Lisa Ng v. Adler (In re Adler), 494 B.R. 43, 57-58 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013), affd, No. 13-
cv-5053(JS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135765, 2014 WL 4793478 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014).
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§ 362 are met at the time of filing.2 6 As "a creature of statute," the
stay's scope is first and foremost "governed . . . by the [statutory]
language[.] '"27
Even as it has recognized the stay's importance to preserving an
estate that is by definition insufficient to pay the debtor's every obli-
gation, Congress has crafted at least twenty-eight exceptions, the orig-
inal eight created for "reasons of either policy or practicality. ' 28 The
only exception potentially applicable to a contempt issued by a state
court at a non-governmental plaintiff's request appears in § 362(b)(1),
which spares "the commencement or continuation of a criminal action
or proceeding against the debtor" from § 362(a). 29 Since the Code's
adoption, the courts have narrowly construed every exception in
§ 362(b), including its first subdivision in the interest of maximizing a
debtor's chance of financial resurgence and his or her creditors'
return.3
0
In any attempt to apprehend the precise contours of § 362(b)(1), a
familiar definitional problem confronts litigants and courts: neither
the statutory text nor the legislative history hints at what kind of event
constitutes a "criminal action or proceeding" for purposes of
§ 362(b)(1). 31 While, "[w]here ...congressional intent is clear," a
court's "sole function is to enforce the statute according to its
26. Most circuits hold that actions taken in violation of § 362 are void. Mokuba N.Y. LLC v.
Pitts (In re Pitts), No. 808-74860-reg, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4023, at *9-10, 2009 WL 4807615, at
*3-4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2009) (collecting cases); Donna Renee Tobar, The Need for a
Uniform Void Ab Initio Standard for Violations of the Automatic Stay, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 3,
23-34 (2002) (summarizing the case law).
27. Atkins v Martinez (In re Atkins), 176 B.R. 998, 1005-06 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994); accord,
e.g., Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 910-11 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008); In re
Blarney, Inc., 53 B.R. 162, 164 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
28. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 342 (1977). The original exceptions, mostly unchanged, now
appear in § 362(b)(1)-(6), (8), and (9). RICHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAP-
TER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE § 4.03 (2013). In addition to the exceptions encoded in this
subsection, the court has the power to terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay
as it thinks appropriate, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1); 134 Baker St., Inc. v. Georgia, 47 B.R. 379, 381 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
("[Section] 362(b)(1) is a broad provision allowing the enforcement of criminal laws and all
penalties incident thereto notwithstanding a § 362(a) stay").
30. E.g., Lincoln Say. Bank, FSB v. Suffolk Cnty. Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing
Ass'n), 880 F.2d 1540, 1547 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1988).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1). Compare Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Ex-
ceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 409 (2012) ("While Congress
has provided a great level of detail in constructing a framework for distribution, substantial gaps
nonetheless exist.") with Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 298-97 (1993) (describing the numerous
areas of law left to a bankruptcy judge's discretion under chapter 11).
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terms,"32 the dearth of an explicit statutory definition of a 'criminal
action or proceeding' compels resort to well-established principles of
statutory interpretation. As courts almost uniformly agree, a state
court order plainly branded with the talismanic phrase "criminal con-
tempt" and issued during a clearly denominated criminal proceeding
satisfies § 362(b)(1). 33 A civil contempt, however, may in effect be a
criminal one, for many "[c]ontempts are neither wholly civil nor alto-
gether criminal. '34 In other words, unlike other juridical events ef-
fortlessly classified as one or the other, some contempts may not be so
readily branded.35 This observation, reiterated for more than a hun-
dred years, counsels for a holistic reading attentive to the order's
"character and purpose" 36 that few courts have successfully employed
when encountering apparent vindicatory contempts.37
B. A Modified Plain Meaning Approach to Code Interpretation
1. General Canons: Language and Purposes of § 362(a) and (b)
The interpretation of a Code provision, like any other federal stat-
ute, begins with its language.38 If the text is both plain and unambigu-
ous, a court's review ends,39 and the language, though the result may
32. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990), superseded by statute,
Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865.
33. E.g., United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 41 B.R. 457, 460 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Valle v.
Montgomery Cnty., Md. (In re Valle), 456 B.R. 228, 232-33 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011). As this
article illustrates, this default predisposition is itself problematic due to the deference it accords
to another court's view of a contempt's "criminal" nature. See infra Part III.C.
34. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911), cited in Finn v. Schiller,
72 F.3d 1182, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing the difficulty in categorizing a particular contempt
order); see also, e.g., Jennifer Fleischer, In Defense of Civil Contempt Sanctions, 36 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 35, 55 (2002) ("[T]he law of contempt is highly discretionary and the boundary
between civil and criminal contempt is often vague.").
35. In re Weiss, 703 F.2d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Many forms of disobedience may be dealt
with either as acts of civil contempt, or as acts of criminal contempt, or as both."); see also, e.g.,
McGuffin v. Springfield Hous. Auth., 662 F. Supp. 1546, 1548-49 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (discussing the
differences between criminal and civil contempt and emphasizing that the content of an order
lies mostly in the issuing court's discretion).
36. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925); ef Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 104
(2d Cir. 2006) ("The contempt power that Blackstone described in his Commentaries... was not
limited to what we now describe as punitive or criminal contempt, but included also the coercive
power now described as civil contempt.").
37. For these and other decisive features, see infra Part IV.B.
38. McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm't, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)).
39. E.g., Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2012) (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)); Tyler v. Douglas, 280 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 174 F.3d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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be harsh and unfair, must be applied.40 In ascertaining a statute's de-
gree of ambiguity or plainness, an interpreter must attend to "the lan-
guage itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and
the broader context of the statute as a whole. ' 41 Context is often de-
cisive, for any ambiguity generated by one term's multiple ordinary
denotations may yet be dispelled if "only one of the[se] permissible
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest
of the law."' 42 Analytically, plainness and ambiguity are thus dispa-
rate, albeit closely-related, concepts, and it is context that determines
which of many plain denotations most impeccably fits the statutory
scheme, the text thereby shown to be both plain and unambiguous.
Even if so found, courts may refuse to apply the plain and unambigu-
ous meaning if (1) "an absurd result" would follow, 43 (2) there is
"clear evidence of contrary legislative intent" 44 in the few extrinsic
sources deemed relatively reliable by scholars and jurists; (3) that
clear meaning fails to achieve any plausible purpose, its clarity the
product of some "obvious clerical or typographical error[ ];-45 and (4)
a conflict with a constitutional provision would be engendered. 46 In
all other cases, if a textual and contextual analysis discloses one cer-
tain meaning, the language is plain and unambiguous, its import dis-
40. See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) ("Our unwillingness to
soften the import of Congress' chosen words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh out-
come is longstanding."); Cent. Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454
U.S. 354, 360 (1982) (per curiam) ("While the Court of Appeals may have reached a practical
result, it was a result inconsistent with the unambiguous language used by Congress."). But see
Rockefeller v. Comm'r, 676 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[J]udges should interpret statutes in
ways that effectuate legislative purpose and avoid unnecessarily harsh and unfair results.").
41. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341; see also Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26,
35 (1990) ("[I]n expounding a statute, we are not guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy" (quoting
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)).
42. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 748 (1988)
quoted in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2011).
43. United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., BKCAP,
LLC v. Captec Franchise Trust 2000-I, 572 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2009).
44. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1281; see also, e.g. United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982. 986
(8th Cir. 2000); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983).
45. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092,
1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting); see also U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of
Am., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993) (describing the placement of quotation marks as "a simple scriv-
ener's error, a mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the law's object and design," and ad-
ding, "[clourts, we have said, should 'disregard the punctuation, or repunctuate, if need be, to
render the true meaning of the statute"' (quoting Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77,
84-85 (1882))).
46. Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381-82 (2004); see also Laidlaw Transit, 448 F.3d
at 1097 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (summarizing the canon).
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positive and conclusive. 47 As to the Code, partly attributable to the
conception of the Code's origins championed by the Court-"The
Bankruptcy Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly)
area of law" 4 8-and representing a sharp departure from bankruptcy
law's earlier equitable inclinations,49 a stringent, albeit strained, 50 tex-
tualism now reigns supreme. 51
By virtue of this paradigm's stress on "broader context, ' 52 no text
may be read in isolation, and attention must always be paid to the
"obvious and dominating general purpose" 53 of the Code as a whole
and, in particular, the relevant statutory piece in interpreting any one
of its sections. As the courts often note, the two purposes of a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation are the debtor's discharge of all debts not subject to
an exception itemized in § 52354 and the satisfaction of valid claims
against the debtor's estate via a pro rata distribution of its assets.55
Enacted so as "to prevent a race by creditors, provide an orderly liqui-
dation involving equal treatment of creditors, and provide breathing
room for the debtor free from actions against the debtor and its as-
sets," § 362(a) is widely seen as pivotal to these broader ends'
realization. 56
47. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009).
48. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012).
49. Compare Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) ("[W]hatever
equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the
confines of the Bankruptcy Code."), with SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310
U.S. 434, 455 (1940) ("A bankruptcy court is a court of equity ... and is guided by equitable
doctrines and principles except in so far as they are inconsistent with the Act."). See Adam J.
Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Re-
gime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2006), for a discussion of the origins of "the court of equity
maxim". The phrase still escapes lawyers' mouths with regularity. Marcia S. Krieger, "The
Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity": What Does that Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REv. 275, 297 (1999).
50. See Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Su-
preme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 107 (1996) ("[T]he Court's commit-
ment to textualism in bankruptcy cases is quite inconsistent."); see also infra Part III.B.2.
51. See, e.g., Peter H. Carroll III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology
for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143, 151 (1993); Charles
Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 875-76 (1991).
52. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
53. United States v. DuBose, 598 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Miller v. Amusement
Enters., Inc., 395 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1968)).
54. In re Focus Capital, Inc., 504 B.R. 296, 303 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2014); Lowry v. Croft (In re
Croft), 500 B.R. 823, 857 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013) (quoting In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172
(5th Cir. 1991)).
55. Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982)); Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d
1060, 1069 (5th Cir. 1986).
56. Nat'l Bank v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d
916. 927 (8th Cir. 2012) (relying on H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977)); see also, e.g., Halo
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Akin in purpose to §§ 707, 727, and 523, the exceptions encoded in
§ 362(b) play a different role. By "help[ing] ensure that debtors do
not use a declaration of bankruptcy to avoid the consequences of their
actions that threaten the public interest,"57 § 362(b) does not aim ei-
ther to preserve an estate or to augment a debtor's potential relief.
Instead, it embodies a third cardinal bankruptcy principle: the Code's
protection and promised fresh start is given only to the "unfortunate
and honest debtor[ ].-58 Based in part on this axiom, some courts hold
that § 362(a) should not be interpreted "to preclude post-petition suits
to enjoin unlawful conduct," a frankly admitted grafting of a non-stat-
utory exception unto the Code's text.5 9
2. Bankruptcy-Specific Canons: Salience of Pre-Code Practice
and State Law
While it routinely relies upon these general canons, the Court also
consistently accords great weight to three exceptional factors in its
bankruptcy opinions. The invocation of these precepts rarely occurs
separately from its ostensible plain meaning analyses of miscellaneous
Code provisions, the Court frequently, incorporating them into its ex-
egeses. 60 Indeed, whenever a term in a statute possesses multiple
plain meanings and thus retains its ambiguity-"[a]mbiguity only ex-
ists so long as several plausible interpretations of the same statutory
Wireless, Inc. v. Alenco Commc'ns Inc. (In re Halo Wireless, Inc.), 684 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir.
2012); Reedsburg Util. Comm'n v. Grede Foundries, Inc. (In re Grede Foundries, Inc.), 651 F.3d
786, 790 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d at 508). The oft-quoted legislative
history makes clear that the automatic stay serves two equal purposes: "debtor protection" and
"creditor protection." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340. The House Report proclaims:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bank-
ruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors .... Bankruptcy is
[also] designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors
are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents
that.
Id., quoted in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Labuzan, 579 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009).
57. In re Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588 (construing the purpose behind the exception in
§ 362(b)(4)).
58. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1101, 1103, 1108 (1833); Mar-
rama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007); H.H. Shelton, Bankruptcy Law, Its History and
Purpose, 44 AM. L. REV. 394, 404 (1910). This particular focus of bankruptcy law, whether
English or American, is a venerable one. The first Anglo-Saxon introducing the concept of a
discharge, the Statute of Anne, was titled "An act to prevent frauds committed by bankrupts."
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 10-11, 11 n.38 (1995).
59. See Dominic's Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, 683 F.3d 757, 760 (6th Cir. 2012) ("But the
automatic stay protection does not apply in all cases; there are statutory exemptions, and there
are non-statutory exceptions.").
60. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716. 719-20 (2011).
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text, specific and different in substance, can be advanced" 6 1-these
principles are used to resolve which ambiguous connotation does not
cohere with the statutory structure and deserves rejection, 62 allowing
a plain meaning to emerge by elimination instead of divination.
Operating in tandem, these three specialized canons share a focus,
demarcating the extent to which a Code section is said to have over-
ruled legal precedent and past practice. First, as to the salience of
much pre-Code practice, while the Code "can of course override by
implication when the implication is unambiguous," where the intent to
do is doubtful, such pre-Code practice should not be disregarded. 63 In
the use of this canon, a division is drawn between certain types of pre-
Code rules. If such rules are not significant or widespread and are not
heretofore recognized by the Court, they resemble "flexible guidelines
which have been developed by the courts in the exercise of their equi-
table powers."'64 The supposition that Congress was aware of the exis-
tence of the pre-Code rules when the Code was drafted and adopted is
relatively weak, and any seemingly contrary statutory purpose,
whether expressly stated in the Code or implied by its terms or struc-
ture, will serve to negate their pertinence. 65 In contrast, when "pre-
Code practice . . . reflect[s] policy considerations of great longevity
and importance," the Court must find express repudiation in the
adopted text or unambiguous legislative history for this practice to be
superseded. 66 Second, such deference is extended to "long-estab-
lished traditions of state regulation," whether statutory or common
law in origin. 67 Over the last few decades, the Court has recognized a
number of "topics and fields of law as [such] traditional areas of state
61. In re Asher, 488 B.R. 58, 64 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Rombro v. Dufrayne (In re
Med Diversified, Inc.), 461 F.3d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding language "reasonably suscepti-
ble" to a "narrow construction" and a "broader reading" to be ambiguous); 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:2 (7th ed. 2014) ("Modern courts typi-
cally frame the issue by stating that ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being under-
stood by reasonably well-informed persons it two or more different senses.").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (citing N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52-53 (1982) (plurality opinion), superseded
by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1984)).
63. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994).
64. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Boston
& Maine Corp., 719 F.2d 493, 496 (1st Cir. 1983)).
65. Adam J. Wiensch, Comment, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-
Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1847 (1991).
66. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 245 (citing as examples Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986)
and Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986)).
67. BFP, 511 U.S. at 546; accord Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. California ex rel. Cal. Dep't of Toxic
Substances Control, 350 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Even though bankruptcy is one of only
two federal legislative powers in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution in which the power to
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concern," including regulation of local gas franchises and hospital bill-
ing, domestic relations, and real property.68 Third, absent explicit
statutory direction, the Code should not be read as to "expand the
rights of debtors or their creditors beyond those necessary to adjust
their relationship or otherwise diminish either (i) the rights or prerog-
atives of parties outside of the debtor-creditor relationship ("Third
Parties") for the benefit of the debtor or the creditors or (ii) the
nonbankruptcy rights of the debtor or the creditors for the benefit of
these Third Parties. '69 These maxims collectively contribute to bank-
ruptcy law's interpretive structure, the Code's explicit text but a start-
ing point.
Within bankruptcy jurisprudence, these interpretive tenets are not,
as some commentators suggest, separable from the predominant plain
meaning analysis. 70 True, these presumptions would be improper to
consider if a Code section is conclusively regarded as plain and unam-
biguous at first glance, whether due to the existence of a definite and
certain specialized meaning in the relevant statute or due to the per-
fect fit of an unusually uncontroversial and natural denotation. Still,
such seamless congruencies of obvious purposes and irrefutable se-
mantics are rare, and a holistic, not a hypertechnical, reading is the
modern imperative. 71 Thus, while a court should not engage in specu-
lation about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before
it, it must still discern a statute's intended application by logic and
make 'uniform' laws is made explicit, the presumption against displacing state law by federal
bankruptcy law is just as strong in bankruptcy as in other areas of federal legislative power.").
68. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 70, 70 n.23 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing, inter
alia, BFP, 511 U.S. at 544), affd, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
69. Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDAM L. REV. 1063. 1067 (2002)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy]; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 71 (1982) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations
... is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power"), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as
amended in 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1984)). Naturally, exceptions abound. Bankruptcy, supra note
69, at 1103-04.
70. Neil M. Berman & Thomas F. Waldron, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A
Judicial Perspective after Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 212-13 (2007).
71. See, e.g., Green v. City of Raleigh, 523 F.3d 293, 306 (4th Cir. 2008) (stressing the Court's
consistent refusal to adopt "hypertechnical theories as to what a statute covers"); Ltd., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 286 F.3d 324, 333-34 (6th Cir. 2002) ( "[A] hypertechnical analysis [may be] at odds
with a plain language interpretation of the statute[.]"); New Castle Cnty. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 970 F.2d 1267, 1270 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he question is not whether there is an ambi-
guity in the metaphysical sense, but whether the language has only one reasonable meaning
when construed, not in a hypertechnical fashion, but in an ordinary, common sense manner.");
cf. Amera-Seiki Corp. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 721 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that, as to
an insurance policy, courts interpret the language "from a reasonable rather than a hypertechni-
cal viewpoint" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Boelman v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co.,
826 N.W.2d 494, 501 (Iowa 2013)).
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projection. 72 Because these principles cannot but matter in discerning
a statute's probable applications and hence the meaning both envi-
sioned and legislated, they constitute an inextricable part of the med-
ley of rules that a court should consider in the analysis of any Code
provision. 73 Only the statute as illumined by these rules is one cor-
rectly read. 74
C. Flaws in the Three Popular Approaches
to Vindicatory Contempts
As courts ponder how to fit vindicatory contempts into the binary
framework erected by § 362(a)(1) and (b)(1), three approaches gain
noticeable popularity. No obvious majority coalesces around one ap-
proach, although most courts reject a constricted definition of "crimi-
nal" and few fail to acknowledge this diversity before settling on a
specific line, more often than not citing the same language with little
additional commentary.75 Unfortunately, questionable leaps in logic
and gap-filled foundations typify these opinions. While each of the
three leading appraisals has its own textual or practical appeal, all fail
to satisfy the courts' requisite obligation "to interpret the Code clearly
and predictably using [the] well established principles of statutory
construction '76 discussed in this article's preceding section.77
1. Criminal vs. Criminal Law
A number of courts "distinguish a criminal action or proceeding
(brought to enforce criminal law), from a civil contempt order (a judi-
cial act to enforce a judicial directive or preserve the court's dig-
72. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000), quoted in United States v. Coronado, 461 F.
Supp. 2d 1209, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
73. See, e.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2011) ("[Tlhe text, con-
text, and purpose of the statutory provision at issue [§ 1325] preclude [any other] result");
Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 786-87 (2010) (defending its interpretation of Section 522(f) as
consistent with both the Code and "the historical treatment of bankruptcy exemptions").
74. See generally Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242 (2014).
75. But see Forsberg v. Pefanis, No. 1:07-cv-03116-JOF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55297, at *2,
2010 WL 2331465, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2010) ("The majority of courts ... have considered
whether the civil contempt proceeding is one intended to effectuate collection of a judgment or
one which is intended to uphold the dignity of the court.").
76. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012); cf.
Wiensch, supra note 65, at 1860 ("The lack of uniformity in bankruptcy practice resulting from
the courts' equitable interpretation was one of the driving forces behind the modernization of
the bankruptcy laws.").
77. See supra Part III.B.
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nity)."78 These courts define "criminal law" as "(a) a legislative
enactment (b) applicable to at least a class (c) prohibiting specified
conduct and (d) providing punishment by fine payable to, or imprison-
ment by, the state (e) upon the state's complaint. '79 Under this ru-
bric, because a vindicatory contempt "resembles a criminal action
only to the extent it employs the sanction of either a fine or imprison-
ment," it enforces no criminal law and is a civil action.80 In the words
of one court, "[i]t is the integrity of the criminal justice system which
§ 362(b)(1) protects;" when a party "seek[s] criminal sanctions for
conduct which might give rise to civil liability, it is seeking to vindicate
punitive and deterrent interests which differ, if only in degree, from
those vindicated in a civil suit," marking the action as civil in charac-
ter.81 To these tribunals, the order's purpose is an extraneous consid-
eration, as the absence of a basis in a penal statute bars the
application of § 362(b)(1), any other interpretation repeatedly derided
as too expansive.8 2
This approach's first fault arises from its dependence on a single
source: state criminal law. By reducing § 362(b)(1)'s "criminal action
and proceeding" to an action to enforce a "criminal law" and by defin-
ing "criminal law" as "a legislative enactment" enforceable only by
the state and via "the state's complaint," the advocates of this ap-
proach needlessly adopt a definition of "criminal" rooted in state
law.83 Undoubtedly, federal courts habitually defer to the relevant
state law's classification of certain actions as civil or criminal if the
state court issues a contempt order.84 But, § 362(b) is a federal statute
that does, but does not self-evidently, incorporate state criminal stan-
dards.8 5 Federal law and a particular state's penal law might differ as
78. In re Rook, 102 B.R. 490, 493 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (citing Dock C-Food Ltd. v. Cherry
(In re Cherry), 78 B.R. 65, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Dervaes, 81 B.R. 127, 129 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1987)).
79. In re Dervaes, 81 B.R. at 129, cited in In re Sims, 101 B.R. 52, 54 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1989) ("A 'criminal' action or proceeding is one brought to enforce criminal law.").
80. In re Dervaes, 81 B.R. at 129.
81. In re Sims, 101 B.R. at 55 (emphasis added).
82. In re Dervaes, 81 B.R. at 129; see also United States v. Chris-Marine, U.S.A., Inc. (In re
Chris-Marine, U.S.A., Inc.), 321 B.R. 63, 67 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (commenting that the debtor "ef-
fectively contends that Section 362(a) encompasses all claims or civil causes of action, including
civil contempt actions, which arose pre-petition"); cf In re Daniels, 316 B.R. 342. 348 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2004) ("When Debtor filed for bankruptcy relief, any further proceedings in the state
court action were unconditionally stayed by operation of federal law.")
83. In re Dervaes, 81 B.R. at 129.
84. E.g., In re Maloney, 204 B.R. 671, 674 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (New York law); In re
Dervaes, 81 B.R. at 129 (Florida law).
85. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600. 603 (1971) ("There are, of course, instances
in which the application of certain federal statutes may depend on state law .... In the absence
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to whether certain actions are branded as "criminal; ' 8 6 the present
distinction between the legal status of marijuana possession in Colo-
rado and federal law is only the most topical example of this federalist
dichotomy. A particular state penal statute may, of course, provide as
the main clue as to the proper grading of a contempt as "criminal" or
"civil." Even so, no congressional edict or compelling judicial practice
designates this font as the only possible linchpin for the expatiation of
a term inlaid in § 362(b), a federal statute, whenever a vindicatory
contempt must be classified for its precise purposes. But this first ap-
proach, with no definite statutory backing, openly does so.
This absolute focus on state criminal law, moreover, obscures this
approach's neglect of definite federal precedent. While many states'
laws permit a criminal contempt to issue only during the course of a
criminal proceeding, the Court has embraced a less stringent view for
more than two centuries, allowing that vindicatory contempts do in
fact punish "crime[s] in the ordinary sense."87 Any other understand-
ing, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once opined, would violate
"the most fundamental characteristic of [']crimes['] as the word has
been understood in English speech," for such contempts, however de-
scribed or pigeonholed, are intrinsically "infractions of the law, visited
with punishment as such."' 8 For these reasons, whatever the formal
designation of a particular contempt under state law, the term "crimi-
nal action or proceeding" in a federal statute like § 362(b) is easily
read to incorporate vindicatory contempts, such a definition as credi-
of a plain indication to the contrary.., it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a statute that it
does not intend to make its application dependent on state law." (quoting Jerome v. United
States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord United States v.
One 1973 Rolls Royce, V.I.N. SRH-16266, 43 F.3d 794, 804 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994). Tellingly, this
tendency is particularly strong in cases involving federal criminal law. Jerome, 318 U.S. at
104-05.
86. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 241-44 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968); see also, e.g., Gompers v. United States, 233
U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328-30 (1904); United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). The Court bolstered its conclusion with an
additional observation about the purpose behind such contempts: "Criminally contemptuous
conduct may violate other provisions of the criminal law; but even when this is not the case
convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for
their impact on the individual defendant is the same." Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201; accord United
States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 700 (1988) ("The fact that the allegedly criminal
conduct concerns the violation of a court order instead of common law or a statutory prohibition
does not render the prosecution any less an exercise of the sovereign power of the United
States.").
88. Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610.
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ble as any yoked to a state penal law.89 Section 362(b) may yet be
ambiguous due to the fact that the word "criminal" possesses multiple,
equally viable denotations. 90 Nonetheless, at least one plain meaning
of this essential term, these precedents indicate, does enfold vindica-
tory contempts, a fact often missed by this first school.
Just as improperly, the courts committed to this narrowest of paths
have rewritten the statute to be what it is not, defying a grave prohibi-
tion.91 In effect, these courts substitute the actual phrase in
§ 362(b)(1)-"a criminal action or proceeding"-with an atextual
one-"an action or proceeding to enforce a criminal law." If Con-
gress wished to restrict the exception in § 362(b)(1) solely to the latter
types of actions, it would have employed that construction. As Con-
gress did not, a court cannot do so on its behalf, even if it wishes to
dismiss a connotation of "criminal" linguistically consistent with the
statute's express terms for the sake of safeguarding presumed statu-
tory objectives, 92 i.e., a debtor's fresh start or equal treatment of simi-
larly situated creditors.93
In fact, this same principle requires that attention be paid to the
natural denotations of two gravid terms-"criminal" and "criminal
law"-whose philological dissection only further undercuts the first
approach's viability. As conventionally understood, if unfettered to
the noun "law," the standalone adjective "criminal" can refer either to
a "[c]onnect[ion] with the administration of penal justice" 94 or to
"[h]aving the character of a crime," where "crime" is defined as "[a]n
act that the law makes punishable" 95 and "law" as any number of
89. See Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 280 (2010) (reiterating the
Court's previous rejection of the view "that modern criminal contempts are not crimes" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
90. See supra Part III.B.1.
91. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228 (2008) ("We are not at liberty to
rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable.").
92. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)
("[Allthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitu-
tional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute
... or judicially rewriting it." (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Silva-Hernandez v. U.S. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigra-
tion Servs., 701 F.3d 356, 361 (lth Cir. 2012) ("[Courts] cannot add to the terms of the provision
what Congress left out." (quoting CBS Inc. v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1228
(11th Cir. 2001))).
93. See supra Part III.B.1.
94. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "criminal" in its adjective form)
[hereinafter BLACK'S]; see also Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742, 761 (I11. 2009).
95. BLACK'S, supra note 95, at 427, 430 (defining "criminal" and "crime"); see also Snyder v.
King, 745 F.3d 242, 248 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing "crime" as one of "the few words in the
legal lexicon with a more widely understood plain meaning").
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criminal and noncriminal offences. 96 Also called "penal law," the
phrase "criminal law" encompasses a distinct class of actions, referring
to "[t]he body of law defining offenses against the community at large,
regulating how suspects are investigated, charged, and tried, and es-
tablishing punishments for convicted offenders. ' 97 In legal parlance,
it bears an even more restricted understanding, the phrase "commonly
used to include only that part of the general field known as the sub-
stantive criminal law."'98 Significantly, then, only the content of "sub-
stantive criminal law" is wholly circumscribed by state and federal
criminal statutes; that of "criminal law" is not. 99 As this semantic
analysis reveals, in reading "criminal" in § 362(b)(1) as "criminal law"
and "criminal law" as "substantive criminal law," adherents of the
strictest view ignore equally valid connotations of "criminal," i.e.,
"[h]aving the character of a crime," and of "criminal law," i.e., any
"body of law defining offenses against the community at large,"'100
that lets one describe an action as "criminal" without it being linked
to an official prosecution or a substantive penal regulation.10 ' Histori-
cally, a vindicatory contempt is one example of such an action, a de-
batable yet well-established legal fact.10 2
Ignoring the weight of these objections, the opinions that adopt this
first approach tend to recite a truism: "Since it is a fundamental pre-
cept that statutory exceptions like § 362(b) are construed strictly, we
must avoid an expansive reading.' 0 3 This rule, however, is not a
binding command from the Court or from Congress, and like other
canons it is a rule of thumb that may be set aside in the face of persua-
96. BLACK'S, supra note 94, at 962 (defining "law").
97. In re Richland Cnty. Magistrate's Court, 699 S.E.2d 161, 162-63 (S.C. 2010); BLACK'S
supra note 94, at 431.
98. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, Criminal Law 1, 5 (3d ed. 1982) (emphasis
added).
99. BLACK'S, supra note 94, at 1542, 1543, 1544 (defining a "statute" as"[a] law passed by a
legislative body," a "criminal statute" as "a law that defines, classifies, and sets forth punishment
for one or more specific crimes," and a "penal law" as "[a] law that defines an offense and
prescribes its corresponding fine, penalty, or punishment"); United States v. Vanasch, No.
1:09CR3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92514, at *14-15, 2009 WL 3232989, at *6-7 (N.D. W. Va. Aug.
31, 2009) ("Substantive criminal laws are commonly codified into criminal or penal code").
100. BLACK'S, supra note 94, at 962, 430, 431.
101. In fact, it is easy to imagine an act that constitutes an indictable statutory offense in one
jurisdiction but is punished as only a contempt in another. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125,
151-52 (1935) (relying on In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897)).
102. See Lawrence N. Gray, Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a Hodgepodge, 72
ST. JoHN's L. REV. 337, 412-13 (1998) (contending that a contempt under New York State law
may only be criminal or civil but conceding that few courts hold such a rigid view).
103. In re Dervaes, 81 B.R. at 129.
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sive precedent. 10 4 Here, such veracious-and conflicting-authority
populates sundry legal tomes. Indeed, the narrowest of § 362(b) cases
here do not just reject such decidedly incompatible guidance; they also
do not squarely confront the possibility of a federal common law defi-
nition or clarify why "criminal" and "criminal law" must be synonyms
despite their lexicographically significant differences. At the center of
this approach, with its unqualified solicitude for state criminal law,
thus sits an unacceptable void.
2. Punishment vs. Recompense
A second line of authority "examines the circumstances surround-
ing the issuance of the order of contempt, to determine whether the
intent of the court was to satisfy a judgment or to punish. ' 10 5 If the
latter appears to be the dominant intent, the order is deemed "crimi-
nal" for purposes of § 362(b)(1). Where the contempt citation is "de-
signed to uphold an order of a court, and not calculated to enforce a
money judgment, or to harass a defendant, ' 106 its enforcement does
not violate § 362(a)(1). Notably, even the opinions in this vein cannot
agree on whether such contempts are truly "criminal," with some
courts refusing to believe that a contempt denoted as "civil" by the
issuing court can be effectively "turned criminal" due to its vindica-
tory nature. 10 7
A singular methodological flaw mars this second approach: its pred-
icate. Again and again, these courts contend that a court's "inherent
power to punish the debtor for contumacious conduct against the dig-
nity of either the state or federal court, is not curtailed by the bank-
ruptcy action."10 8 Yet, pursuant to both the Bankruptcy Clause' 0 9 and
the Supremacy Clause,110 Congress likely empowered to divest state
104. Cf. Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith), 206 F.3d 1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 2000) (ex-
plaining that canons of construction "are no more than rules of thumb that help courts deter-
mine the meaning of legislation" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)).
105. Int'l Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 62 B.R. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), quoted
in In re Rook, 102 B.R. 490, 493 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
106. Id., 62 B.R. at 730; accord In re Lincoln, 264 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (cita-
tions omitted).
107. Walsh Trucking Co., 62 BR. at 728 (quoting United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025. 1029
(2d Cir. 1978)).
108. Id. at 729 (quoting Guariglia v. Cmty. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 382 F. Supp. 758, 761
(E.D.N.Y. 1974)).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To establish.., uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States[.]").
110. Id. art. VI, para. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall
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courts of the right to exercise this particular inherent power via
§ 362(a)."l Certainly, § 362(a) can be regarded as a plainly stated
"remed[y] ...necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring
the supremacy of [federal bankruptcy] law." 112 Certainly, the lan-
guage can be seen as sweeping all statutorily defined criminal pro-
ceedings, including quasi-criminal ones, within its spacious confines.
Because "policy decisions by Congress pursuant to its bankruptcy
power displace the normal operation of ... [a state's] statutory provi-
sions,"' 13 § 362(a) can be naturally construed as foreclosing the nor-
mal operation of the state courts' inherent contempt powers upon a
petition's filing and the subsequent establishment of federal subject-
matter jurisdiction over most of the debtor's affairs.114 If so, whether
or not the power is intrinsic to their judicial function does not answer
the one relevant question: whether Congress actually decided to de-
nude the state courts of their ability to exercise contempt powers post-
petition via a subsection consciously designed to prevent state courts'
dismemberment of a debtor's estate and to centralize the adjudication
of claims in a preeminent federal court. After all, Congress' targets
are bluntly stated in the legislative record-a debtor's "creditors" and
"the State court[s]"l 5-and its language is outwardly plain.116 This
approach's basic premise, in short, is to answer an inapposite question,
and its conclusion therefore suspect.
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
111. MRS Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Ciir. 1996) ("[Tlhe
unique, historical, and even constitutional need for uniformity in the administration of the bank-
ruptcy laws is another indication that Congress wished to leave the regulation of parties before
the bankruptcy court in the hands of the federal courts alone."); cf. Tenn. . Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004) ("Under our longstanding precedent, States, whether or
not they choose to participate in the proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy court's discharge
order no less than other creditors.").
112. Goldberg v. Ellett (In re Ellett), 254 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (referring to the Ex
Parte Young doctrine).
113. Bondholder Comm. v. Williamson Cnty. (In re Brentwood Outpatient Ltd.), 43 F.3d 256,
264 (6th Cir. 1994); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (noting that although
"States' historic police powers [may] be superseded by a Federal Act," courts will only allow
historic state powers to be superseded when Congress' purpose is "clear and manifest" (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))); Oleksandra Johnson, The Bank-
ruptcy Code as Complete Preemption: The Ultimate Trump?, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 31, 43-56
(2007)(discussing cases regarding the extent of the Code's preemption of state law).
114. This fact may still constitute "cause" for lifting the automatic stay pursuant to Section
362(d). 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2014); see, e.g., In re Xeon Anesthesia of Tex., PLLC, 510 B.R. 106,
110 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014).
115. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340-41 (1977).
116. See Robert M. Charles, Jr., Section 362-Automatic Stay, in NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR.
L. 21 (2013) ("When courts modify statutes to preserve their 'inherent authority' ... one moves
quickly into an unprincipled world where the court does what it wants because it can.").
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3. Inherent Dignity vs. Federal Primacy
Opting for a third route, numerous courts examine "whether the
civil contempt proceeding is one intended to effectuate collection of a
judgment or one which is intended to uphold the dignity of the
court. ' 117 Openly and explicitly, these cases elide the distinction be-
tween "civil" and "criminal"11 8 and, like the second approach, find
that "it is within [a] court's inherent power to take whatever steps
necessary to ensure those persons within its power comply with its
order[ ]."119 Because "[a] civil contempt judgment is one effective
method of coercing compliance and of upholding the dignity of the
court,' 120 it cannot violate § 362(a).12 This third approach shares at
least one operational defect with the second, as both wax lyrically
about all courts' innate contempt power without quite accounting for
the possibility of congressional indifference to this prerogative's post-
petition availability, a predisposition implicit in § 362(a)'s dilatant
prose ("a judicial . . . action or proceeding . . . -),122 at least according
to the many experts committed to the first approach.1 23
Yet, its unique defects are traceable to the oft-cited case, US Sprint
Communications Co. v. Buscher.124 In particular, in US Sprint, the
court defended its unwillingness to subject a vindicatory contempt to
§ 362(a) not only with an insistence on all courts' innate authority but
also with an assumption regarding congressional intent: "The court
cannot conceive that Congress intended to strip the court of this
power, and instead permit a party to blatantly violate direct orders of
117. Forsberg v. Pefanis, No. 1:07-cv-03116-JOF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55297, at *2-3, 2010
WL 2331456, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2010); accord, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Szymanczyk,
No. 92 C 6027, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 900, at *11-16 (N.D. I11. Jan. 26, 1995) (collecting cases).
118. In re Rook, 102 B.R. 490, 493 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); David S. Kennedy, The Trial of
Domestic Relations Issues in Bankruptcy Cases, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 433, 473-74 (1998)
(surveying all three approaches).
119. U.S. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Buscher, 89 B.R. 154, 156 (D. Kan. 1988).
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Stovall v. Stovall, 126 B.R. 814, 815 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (citing In re Corbly, 61 B.R. 851,
856-57 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986); Thruway Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Marini (In re Marini), 28 B.R.
262, 265 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); Gedeon v. Gedeon (In re Gedeon), 31 B.R. 942, 945 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1983)); see also, e.g., In re Dunham, 175 B.R. 615, 617 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994); O'Brien
v. Nachtigal, 153 B.R. 305, 307-08 (D. Or. 1993); Guariglia v. Cmty. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 382
F. Supp. 758, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2014) (emphasis added); Am. Bus. Ass'n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 4-5
(D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[I]t is a rule of law well established that the definite article 'the' particularizes
the subject which it precedes. It is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generaliz-
ing force of 'a' or 'an.'").
123. See supra Part III.C.1.
124. U.S. Sprint, 89 B.R. at 154.
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the court and then seek shelter from a bankruptcy judge."'1 25 Unfortu-
nately, once scrutinized, this boldly stated assumption crumbles.
As a threshold matter, two possible justifications for this presump-
tion - the absurdity and legislative intent exceptions to the plain
meaning rule' 26-must be considered. The second exception allows a
court not to apply "the common sense meaning of the statute"'127 if
"[the] result [will be] demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters. '128 The first is triggered "when literal application of the stat-
utory language at issue results in an outcome that can truly be charac-
terized as absurd, i.e., that is so gross as to shock the general moral or
common sense."'129 Both exceptions, oftentimes termed "canons,"
have long played a special role in statutory interpretation. 30 Yet, in
regards to the classification of vindicatory contempts for purposes of
§ 362(a) and (b), they cannot be reasonably invoked.
Critically (and fatally), the legislative intent exception may only be
brought into play when the literal application of a statute will produce
a result demonstrably at odds with the drafters' intent as evidenced by
dependable external clues. 31 US Sprint, however, did not explain
why congressional intent to foreclose state courts' use of their vener-
able contempt muscle was so remarkable as to be beyond reasonable;
no citation to Court precedent or legislative history appears to but-
tress this blanket assertion regarding congressional design. In fact,
since the legislative record indicates that Congress wished to stop "all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions" against
the debtor and to "relieve him [or her] of the financial pressure that
drove him [or her] into bankruptcy" with § 362(a), 132 it is more than
125. Id. at 156, quoted in In re Lincoln, 264 B.R. 370, 374 n.13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting
that courts have "generally relied" on this passage); see also Asseo ex rel. NLRB v. Bultman
Enters., 951 F. Supp. 307, 313 (D.P.R. 1996) (quoting NLRB v. Sawulski, 158 B.R. 971, 977 (E.D.
Mich. 1993)).
126. See supra Part III.B.1.
127. United States v. Moore, 73 F.3d 666, 668 (6th Cir. 1996).
128. Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g.,
McDown v. Sours (In re Sours), 350 B.R. 261, 266 (Bankr. E.D. Va 2006) (citing United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
129. Hillman v. I.R.S., 263 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel,
226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord RCI Tech. Corp.
v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra), 361 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2004).
130. E.g., Helverting v. Hammell, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941) (legislative intent); Crooks v.
Harelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) (absurdity).
131. See Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 240 (emphasizing that interpretation begins and ends
with "the language of the statute itself" if that language "expresses Congress' intent ... with
sufficient precision so that reference to legislative history and to pre-Code practice is hardly
necessary."); see also supra Part III.B.1.
132. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340-41 (1977).
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conceivable that it attempted to do so with the broad language of this
Code subsection; the explicit and exclusive reference to § 362(b) in
§ 362(a) should be seen as amounting to an implicit congressional pro-
hibition on judicial crafting of other exceptions. 133 Essentially, there-
fore, § 362(a)'s legislative history does not directly disavow a
construction of its terms that appropriates vindicatory contempts.
Precisely because it suggests the opposite with its repetition of the
absolutist "all, '134 this exception appears to be an ill-suited strut for
US Sprint.
The absurdity canon, meanwhile, "allows courts to disregard statu-
tory text when adhering to the text would result in a disposition that
no reasonable person could approve,"1135 but not when the result of
the plain text's application contravenes prior practice or dislodges the
states from a role in a field of area where Congress is constitutionally
sovereign. t 36 For this canon's purposes, language disruptive to estab-
lished practices is not the same as text infected with patent unreason,
with only the latter its trigger, a weighty distinction obscured in US
Sprint and similar opinions. This conclusion is especially true in re-
gards to the Code, a statute that "was intended to modernize the
bankruptcy laws, and as a result made significant changes in both the
substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy" 137 and reflects Con-
gress' use of its barely checked constitutional prerogative. 38 Though
133. 40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 329 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The language of
[S]ection 362 ... suggests that the 18 listed exceptions are the only exceptions to the automatic
stay."); see also Atkins v. Martinez (In re Atkins), 176 B.R. 998, 1005-06 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994)
("The automatic stay of § 362(a) lies unless one of the specific exceptions of § 362(b) is
applicable.").
134. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 41 (3rd ed. 2010) (defining "all" as "used to refer to
the whole quantity or extent of a particular group or thing"); see also Jones v. Estate of Jones,
646 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Wis. 2002) (noting that it would be hard to find a "more simple or compre-
hensive manner" of including every possible right or claim than adding a prefatory "all").
135. Miller v. Clinton, 687 F.3d 1332, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 234 (2012)).
136. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994) ("The Bankruptcy Code can
of course override by implication when the implication is unambiguous."). This power is still
subject to some constitutional constraints, such as those included in the Fifth and Tenth Amend-
ments. See, e.g., FRANK R. KENNEDY, Bankruptcy and the Constitution, in BLESSINGS OF LIB-
ERTY: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 131-74 (ALI-ABA Comm. on
Continuing Prof'l Educ. ed., 1988); James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors'
Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983).
137. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 461
(1999) (quoting Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 240) (internal quotation marks omitted), cited in
Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 369 (2006).
138. See generally Plank, supra note 10, at 487 (discussing the potential breadth of Congress'
power and advocating for a limited understanding).
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by no means lucidly, this second conceivable underpinning of US
Sprint's analysis is seemingly as suspect as the first, neither more than
a mere principle never intended to be strictly accurate or reliable in all
situations.139
This approach's insistence on assumed legislative intent disguises a
more troubling analytical flaw: US Sprint and its progeny, whether in-
tentionally or not, avoid defining the actual statutory terms "civil" and
"criminal." Rather than delving into the terms' past or acknowledging
their possible permutations, these cases employ an amorphous doc-
trine untethered to the statutory language. Quite clearly, the statu-
tory text codifies a strictly binary definitional structure, criteria from
which no litigant and no court may deviate if plain and unambiguous.
Faced with this legislative mandate, US Sprint and others have ignored
it; instead of seeking to define "criminal" and "civil," they have
elected to rest their analyses of § 362(a) and (b) on one a priori princi-
ple. Honoring an interpretive impulse disconnected from the statu-
tory text, these courts' ultimate. deduction-vindicatory contempts
must be outside of § 362(a)'s purview-is hence invalid, however rea-
sonable and appealing it may be.140
IV. APPLICATION
A. Vindicatory Contempts as Criminal Actions or Proceedings
Instead of relying on these three flawed approaches, bankruptcy
courts and parties must turn to the modified plain meaning approach
applicable to the interpretation of all Code provisions. 141 By applying
these precepts, the only concerns relevant to the meaning of "crimi-
nal" in § 362(b)(1) and the boundaries of § 362(a)(1) can be distilled.
Based on such a careful utilization of these basic rules, two separate
justifications can be posited for either the issuing state court or the
139. See Sebelius v Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 825-26 (2013) (describing all
canons as "rule[s] of thumb ... that can tip the scales when a statute could be read in multiple
ways" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253 (1992)).
140. Welzel v. Advocate Realty Invs., LLC (In re Welzel), 275 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001)
("The statutory language of the Bankruptcy Code should not be trumped by generalized equita-
ble pronouncements[.]"); accord New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores,
Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[The Code]
does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavail-
able under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.") (internal quotation
marks omitted); In re Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Section
105(a) gives the court general equitable powers, but only insofar as those powers are applied in a
manner consistent with the Code .... Nor does [§] 105(a) give the court the power to create
substantive rights that would otherwise be unavailable under the Code." (citations omitted)).
141. See supra Part III.B.
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bankruptcy court finding a particular contempt to be exempt from
§ 361(a)(1). 142 While a court or litigant may confidently rest on either
ground, both rationales meet modern jurisprudence's strict interpre-
tive standards.
The first basis can be succinctly stated: because this statutory sub-
section is a federal law supreme over any contrary state edict absent
incorporation, a federal definition of "criminal" may control regard-
less of how a contempt order is categorized by the state court or under
state law. For a number of reasons, this method might not be favored.
Some may fret that the issuing court's description of its own order
should control, or perhaps, to the extent a bankruptcy court adopts a
definition that impinges upon a party's state law rights, this approach
contravenes the omnipresent bankruptcy principle famously promul-
gated in Burner v. United States: "Property interests are created and
defined by state law.' .43 Nevertheless, this rule reflects the courts'
assumption that bankruptcy law is not designed to profoundly alter
property rights, and it may be rejected if federal bankruptcy policy, as
embedded in a Code subsection like § 362(a) and (b), compels a dif-
ferent result.144 The breadth of the language in § 362(a), purportedly
cabined by § 362(b) alone, implies a congressional intent not to allow
state courts to invoke purely state law so as to impede the stay's oper-
ation, as does the fact that if the stay did not apply, the chances of a
pro rata distribution and a debtor's thorough financial rehabilitation,
the Code's familiar twin ends, would be greatly diminished. Even if
142. Most courts hold that bankruptcy courts have concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdic-
tion to determine the applicability of the automatic stay. Rogers v. Overstreet (In re Rogers),
164 B.R. 382, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994); accord, e.g., In re Martinez, 227 B.R. 442, 444-45
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1998); In re Montana, 185 B.R. 650, 652 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Baldwin-
United Corp. Litig., 765 F.2d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 1985). Whether a state court judgment regarding
the stay's applicability is insulated from a bankruptcy court's review pursuant to the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine is a separate and unsettled issue. Compare Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles
(In re Gruntz), 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (doctrine does not apply), and Hamilton v.
Herr (In re Hamilton), 540 F.3d 367, 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2008) (doctrine does not apply), with
Castelle v. New York, 39 F. App'x 665, 667 (2d Cir. 2002) (doctrine does apply), and Ferren v.
Searcy Winnelson Co. (In re Ferren), 227 B.R. 279, 283-84 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998) (doctrine does
apply), affd, 203 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 2000).
143. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), cited in Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp.
(In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting); see also Marciano
v. Fahs (In re Marciano), 459 B.R. 27, 53 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (summarizing the Butner
principle).
144. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942) (holding that Erie does not
require bankruptcy courts to apply state law if federal bankruptcy law controls); see also, e.g., In
re Ford, 967 F.2d at 1049-50, 1050 n.6; In re Belknap, Inc., 909 F.2d 879, 881-82 (6th Cir. 1990);
Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 633, 639 (2004),
cited in Advanced Coatings, Int'l, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 485 B.R. 642, 646-47 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 2013).
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these objections convince, many courts' failure to address the possibil-
ity of a federal definition of criminal contempt that includes vindica-
tory contempts cannot be dismissed as an inconsequential oversight.
In addition, the existence of a non-statutory exception for vindica-
tory contempts, the central holding of US Sprint and its progeny, can
be defended based on pre-Code practice and its consistency with the
Code's encoded purposes. These sources provide a firm grounding for
this exception, never fully articulated in an overwhelming majority of
cases, that observes rather than subverts bankruptcy law's regnant
scheme. From this examination, alternative reasons for endorsing the
result reached in US Sprint may be derived.
1. Criminal under Federal Common Law
In a history strangely underexplored, clear precedent establishes a
federal definition of "criminal contempt" identical to that proposed by
the court in US Sprint. Broadly speaking, "[s]entences for criminal
contempt are punitive in their nature and are imposed for the purpose
of vindicating the authority of the court."'1 45 As a matter of this long-
standing federal common law, a contempt is "criminal" if it is both
punitive and designed to vindicate a court's authority. 146 Tradition-
ally, indeed as far back in time as the early nineteenth century, the
label appended by the sanctioning court was regarded as irrelevant,
and a contempt was never needed to issue during a proceeding to en-
force a criminal law to be reckoned "criminal.' 1 47 Instead, as the fed-
eral courts had settled by the early twentieth century, "[c]ivil
contempt differs from criminal contempt in that it seeks only to
coerc[e] the defendant to do, '148 and two subcategories of civil con-
145. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947); see also, e.g., Eck v.
Dodge Chem. Co. (In re Power Recovery Sys.), 950 F.2d 798, 802 n.18 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 302-04.). Some states use the same test. See, e.g., Kentucky v.
Ivy, 353 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Ky. 2011); Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985); Aired v.
Celanese Corp. of Am., 54 S.E.2d 240, 249-50 (Ga. 1949).
146. E.g., Iskric v. Commonwealth Fin. Sys., Inc. (In re Iskric), 496 B.R. 355,362 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 2013); Capital Source Fin. LLC v. Delco Oil Co., 520 F. Supp. 2d 684, 687 (D. Md. 2007); but
see In re Sims, 101 B.R. 52, 55 n.6 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1989) (rejecting this definition of "crimi-
nal" and contending that a "criminal" punishment must flow from "[a] violation of the criminal
law" (quoting United States v. Toxler Hosiery Co., Inc., 41 B.R. 457, 461 (D.N.C. 1984), affd,
796 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1986))).
147. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (holding that even when "criminally contemp-
tuous conduct" does not "violate other provisions of the criminal law[,] ... convictions for crimi-
nal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions.").
148. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also, e.g., Sieverding v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 847 F. Supp. 2d 75, 87 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Turner,
131 S. Ct. at 2516).
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tempt then existed and still remain-compensatory and punitive-the
former designed to compensate the complainant for damages "caused
by past acts of disobedience" and the latter meant "to aid the plaintiff
by bringing a defiant party into compliance with the court order. 11 49
In contrast, as these same opinions affirm, criminal contempt was and
is calculated to punish a party for an "insult to the court ... [,] a
rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial pro-
cess," the absence of a root in penal law immaterial to deducing the
order's core. 150 Thus, within the realm of federal common law, so
long as a party engages in "willful and deliberate defiance of the
court's order" and "the consequences of the contumacious behavior"
affront "the public interest,"15' a court's resulting contempt is inescap-
ably "criminal in nature. '152 Not insignificantly, to determine whether
an order offends a court's dignity and qualifies as criminal, a court
needs to look "beyond the label" and analyze its "true nature;" with
such contextual investigation favored, the technical nature of the pro-
ceedings from which the contempt issued or an order's statutory root
could never singularly decisive.153 In sum, per a functional standard in
effect for two hundred years, 154 a vindicatory contempt is regularly
viewed as a criminal action.' 55
In a most comprehensive fashion, the use of this federal definition
rectifies the first approach's terminal mistake: by insisting that a pro-
ceeding must be one to enforce criminal statutory law to qualify as
"criminal" under § 362(b)(1), these advocates utilize a circumscribed
definition that the Court repeatedly rejects and they engage in a read-
149. Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d 1336, 1344 (3d Cir. 1976),
quoted in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 633 F.2d 302, 311
(3d Cir. 1980).
150. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 328-29 (1996) (quoting Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506, 516 (1974)).
151. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-03 (1947).
152. In re Rook, 102 B.R. 490, 493 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
153. In re Lincoln, 264 B.R. 370, 373-74 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001); accord, e.g., United States v.
Henry, No. 7:08mc003, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50892, at *9, 2008 WL 2625359, at *3 (W.D. Va.
June 30, 2008); In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 351 (1st Cir. 1985).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 582 F.3d 512, 515 (3d Cir. 2009) ("It has long been
recognized that courts possess the inherent authority to hold persons in contempt."); United
States v. Allen, 587 F.3d 246, 254 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The Supreme Court has held that it is long
settled that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience
to their orders." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
155. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147-50 (1935); see also, e.g., Latrobe Steel Co. v.
United Steel Workers of America, 545 F.2d 1336, 1343, 1343 nn.29, 30 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The
purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court. Criminal contempt seeks
to punish past acts of disobedience and may be maintained only with the court's approval."
(quoting, inter alia, Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 445-46 (1911);
Kienle v. Jewel Tea Co., 222 F.2d 98, 99-100 (7th Cir. 1955))).
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ing narrower than the language decrees or history implies. 156 Federal
courts may often turn to state law to define ambiguous terms with an
ingrained common law meaning, but here no such need arises because
federal law, which within bankruptcy is preeminent over any state
stricture absent evident incorporation,'5 7 defines criminal contempt
holistically on dozens of occasions. 158 Based on this history alone, the
cataloguing of vindicatory contempts as "criminal" matters under
§ 362(b)(1) can be said to constitute "pre-Code practice ... [that is]
significant because it reflect[s] policy considerations of great longevity
and importance," practice that, unless expressly overturned by Con-
gress, is to be harmonized with the Code itself.' 59 With the Code and
legislative record silent as to the nature of these contempts, a federal
definition of "criminal" incorporating vindicatory contempts for pur-
poses of § 362(b)(1) accommodates this pre-Code past. It thereby
achieves an interpretive objective unique to bankruptcy law,'160 by pre-
serving, rather than artificially constricting, the natural connotation of
this subsection's key adjective.
Concurrently, this route avoids the need to rest upon unproven and
unprovable conjectures. Unlike the second or third, this federal com-
mon law definition makes it unnecessary to speculate as to congres-
sional intent or seek to harmonize the legislative history's expansive
description of the stay's objectives with a seemingly broad definition
of "criminal" in § 362(b)(1). Quite simply, a contempt is to be consid-
ered "criminal," even if not so described by the issuing court, if it is
"designed to vindicate a court's authority. ' 161 A straightforward im-
156. See supra Part III.C.I.
157. See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (though rejecting the
lower court's invocation of substantive consolidation, recognizing this "construct of federal com-
mon law" as valid); In re Harvey, 213 F.3d 318, 321-22 (7th Cir. 2000) (contending that federal
common law should apply because of the strong need for uniformity in bankruptcy law); In re
Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998) (relying on "[a]n unbroken line of cases ... [that] has
imposed .. .[a] requirement as a matter of federal common law"); Levitin, supra note 49, at
64-81 (arguing for the existence of a federal common law of bankruptcy).
158. Cf Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing
when a conflict between a federal rule and a state law arises).
159. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 245 (1989); see also, e.g., Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) ("When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws. it does not write
,on a clean slate.'. .. This Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the
Code, however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major
change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative
history."); In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc., 237 B.R. 518, 523-24 (Bankr, D.D.C.
1999) (citing Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 245); In re Erickson, 104 B.R. 364, 367-68 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1989) (citing Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 245).
160. See supra Part III.B.2.
161. E.g., Iskric v. Commonwealth Fin. Sys., Inc. (In re Iskric), 496 B.R. 355,362 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 2013); Bradley v. Am. Household, Inc., 378 F.3d 373, 378 (4th Cir. 2004).
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portation of a term's established meaning, this classification places
such contempts within the class of judicial actions sheltered by
§ 362(b)(1) with no unwarranted extrapolation. In an opinion dated
January 7, 2014, one bankruptcy court took this position. 62
2. Better Arguments for a Non-Statutory Exception
Because, "[a]t first glance," § 362(a)(1) seems to stay a state court's
power to issue even a civil contempt sanction "because it halts any
judicial proceeding,"1 63 many courts unsurprisingly find US Sprint un-
persuasive. 164 Yet, as the Sixth Circuit,165 Federal Circuit,166 and a
handful of lower federal courts167 have observed in cases dealing with
plaintiffs' potential remedies against defendants-debtors' post-petition
trademark and patent infringement, certain interpretive principles
support recognition of an exception to § 362(a) for vindicatory con-
tempts. Under this view, US Sprint and its ilk are correct although
they do not rely suitably definitive sources of interpretive guidance.
For the first time in opinion or in commentary, this subsection disen-
tangles those sources, interwoven defenses distinguishable from any
theory of federal common law. 16 8
Critical to this explication are the specialized bankruptcy canons
earlier discussed.' 69 Thus, while the Code "standardizes an expansive
(and sometimes unruly) area of law,"' 70 when "essential state inter-
est[s]" are at issue, whether embedded in "contrary state [statutory or
common] law or prior practice," the Code's manifold sections should
"be construed to adopt, rather than to displace, pre-existing state
162. In re Burgess, 503 BR. 154, 156-57 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014).
163. US Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Buscher, 89 B.R. 154, 156 (D. Kan. 1988) (emphasis added);
cf RDLG, LLC v. Leonard (In re Leonard), No. 12-51821, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1001, at *20,
2014 WL 1025823, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (acknowledging that "there is no
specific statutory exception to the automatic stay for contempt actions[.]").
164. In re Lincoln, 264 B.R. 370, 373-74 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing In re Leonard, 231 B.R. 884, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing In re Mickman, No. 93-
11307S, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 585, 1993 WL 128147) (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1993); In re Cherry,
78 B.R. 65, 67-70 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987))).
165. Dominic's Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, 683 F.3d 757, 760 (6th Cir. 2012).
166. Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
167. Am. Auto. Ass'n, Inc. v. Oakhurst Lodge, No. 1:12-cv-0854 LJO-BAM, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 179753, at *7-8, 2012 WL 6608600, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2012); Larami Ltd. v. Yes!
Entm't Corp., 244 B.R. 56, 60 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Cinnabar 2000 Haircutters, Inc., 20 B.R. 575,
577 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
168. See supra Part IV.A.1.
169. See supra Part III.B.2.
170. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012): see
also, e.g., Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 375-76 (7th Cir. 2012) (under-
lining that, absent such pre-Code practice, "views about the purposes behind the Code, and wise
public policy, cannot be used to supersede the Code's provisions.").
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law.1 71 The courts often invoke this principle when "traditional state
regulation" or powers that "inhere[ ] in the very nature of state gov-
ernment" are implicated. 172 Fundamentally, a respect for state enti-
ties' independent sovereignty, a federalist notion, animates this
particular interpretive rule, one triggered by a threshold showing that
the interest implicated is essential. 173
For two reasons, a state court's authority to issue vindicatory con-
tempts should be construed as one of these fundamental state inter-
ests that Congress may suborn only with the clearest statement. First,
"the power of courts to punish for contempts" is incontestably "a nec-
essary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is
absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them
by law,"'1 74 vested in all courts at the moment of creation. 175 Second,
so indispensable a power must also "be as ancient as the laws them-
selves"; 176 not coincidentally, it is "one recognized from ancient times
and by indubitable authority.1 77 The Court itself describes "[t]he
contempt power" as part of "the core of the administration of a
State's judicial system," and even where justified by such statutory au-
thority as § 362(a), "federal-court interference with the State's con-
tempt process" remains "an offense to the State's interest."178
171. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,544-45 (1994); see also, e.g., Carter v. H & B
Jewelry & Loan (In re Carter), 209 B.R. 732, 734-35 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) (relying on BFP, 511
U.s. 531).
172. BFP, 511 U.S. at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (U.S. 2006) ("We ordinarily expect a
clear and manifest statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into tradi-
tional state authority." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
174. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911); see also, e.g., Al-
derwoods Grp. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2012); New England Med. Ctr. Hosps., Inc.
v. PeproTech, Inc., No. 91-5584 (GEB), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20657, at *6, 1996 WL 715515, at
*2 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1996). Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 793,
(1987); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
175. Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994), quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204,
227 (1821) ("Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation,
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their
lawful mandates, and... to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults
of pollution."); States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) ("To fine for contempt -
imprison for contumacy - inforce (sic) the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.").
176. Tenney's Case, 23 N.H. 162, 166 (N.H. 1851) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at
*286).
177. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 565, 599 (1895); see also Young, 481 U.S. at 795 n.7, (1987) (quoting
J. Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 1 (1927)).
178. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court, however, cautioned that this interest was "not quite as important as is the State's interest
in the enforcement of its criminal law . . . or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-
criminal proceeding." Id. at 335. More significantly, Juidice v. Vail and related cases deal solely
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Contrary to what US Sprint contends, it is not its inherent and imme-
morial nature that may render this contempt power safe from the pro-
hibition in § 362(a). Rather, because pre-Code courts long construed
vindicatory contempts as criminal, to excise the state courts' ability to
exercise this prerogative, Congress would have needed to divulge re-
veal in the text or legislative history of § 362(a) or (b) an unequivocal
intent to do so. 179 More precisely, to reject this entrenched under-
standing, absolute exactitude in defining the boundaries of "criminal"
to exclude vindicatory contempts was necessary.
Neither primary nor secondary sources, however, evidence the req-
uisite fastidiousness. The text of § 362(b)(1) does not expressly extir-
pate a vindicatory contempt from the definition of "criminal" wand
nothing in § 362(a) renders it purely civil in character. Although the
language itself is plain, in light of the many pre-1978 opinions treating
civil yet vindicatory contempts as criminal actions, it indeed may be
regarded as ambiguous as to this lone contempt class. 180 This very
possibility in turn counsels against denying the viability of such a fa-
miliar connotation to the adjective "criminal" in § 362(b)(1). Pursu-
ant to this theory, owing to the varied and enduring connotations of
the adjective "criminal" in both federal and state law, a non-statutory
exception for vindicatory contempts may be posited in a manner con-
sistent with prevailing standards of interpretation.
Such an extratextual exception may also be justified by § 362(b)'s
"broader context,"1 81 an important criterion for choosing among any
term's multiple plain meanings.1 82 As a whole, the Code is designed
to provide relief to the unfortunate and honest debtor; 8 3 in fealty to
this known purpose, no court should read § 362(a) so as "to preclude
with the issue of abstention. See, e.g., Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 657 F.3d
876, 886 (9th Cir. 2012); Marciano v. White, 431 F. App'x 611, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2011).
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601, 603 (6th
Cir. 2012).
180. For a discussion of the difference between plainness and ambiguity, see supra Part
III.B.1.
181. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. V. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
182. See Part III.B.
183. Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 374-75 (2007). In the United States, this same
motive has driven several bankruptcy laws. E.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay) ("The power of estab-
lishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce,
and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into
different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question." (emphasis
added)).
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post-petition suits to enjoin unlawful conduct."'1 84 If a debtor so
minded files a petition and claims the automatic stay's protection,
such debtors can "violate plaintiffs' rights with impunity" post-peti-
tion.185 The result would be "demonstrably at odds with the intention
of its drafters,' 86 for instead of relieving the "unfortunate and meri-
torious debtor from a slavery of mind and body, '187 a wholly different
class of persons would be protected by § 362(a): the unlucky and re-
calcitrant. As such, because a definition of "criminal" that integrates
vindicatory contempts thwarts a debtor's attempted maltreatment of a
court of law, inputting this connotation into § 362(b)(1) conforms with
the Code's concern for "unfortunate and honest debtors,' 88 not
merely the unlucky.189 While this inquiry arguably strays from the
text, demonstrably delineated statutory purpose may be utilized to se-
lect an apt plain meaning when more than one may be advanced, 90
and as lexicography attests, the operative term "criminal" is suffi-
ciently nimble enough in its plain denotation to embrace vindicatory
contempts. 191 Albeit suspect in and of itself, this symmetry between a
known purpose and almost antediluvian denotation reinforces the ar-
gument for this construction's adoption.' 92
184. Dominic's Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, 683 F.3d 757, 760-61 (6th Cir. 2012); accord
Ballstaedt v. Curtis (In re Ballstaedt), 500 B.R. 586, 592 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2013) (quoting Do-
minic's Rest, 683 F.3d at 760-61).
185. Dominic's Rest., 683 F.3d at 760-61.
186. ComUnity Collectors LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Serv., No. C-11-4777 EMC, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110690, at *11-12, 2012 WL 3249509, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (citing to
Indep. Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 966 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.
1992)).
187. STORY, supra note 58, at § 1101, cited in In re Marshall, 298 B.R. 684, 692 n.20 (C.D. Cal.
2003); see also Menotte v. Cutaia (In re Cutaia), 410 B.R. 733, 737 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) ("The
purpose of bankruptcy is to provide unfortunate and honest debtors the opportunity to a fresh
start.").
188. STORY, supra note 58, at § 1101, cited in Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 721 F.3d
1032, 1057 n.20 (9th Cir. 2013).
189. E.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365,374-76 (2007); In re Diaz, 120 B.R. 967, 979
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Kozeny, 541 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Our obligation is to
give effect to congressional purpose so long as the congressional language does not itself bar that
result." (quoting Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 710 n.10 (2000)); United States v.
Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he whole act rule of statutory construction ex-
horts us ... to look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)).
191. See Part III.C.1.
192. See Jamo v. Katadhdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 399 (1st Cir. 2002)
("Taken to an extreme, the automatic stay could be construed to prohibit all post-petition con-
tact between creditors and debtors pertaining to dischargeable debts, including the negotiation
of reaffirmation agreements. But the Bankruptcy Code should be read as a whole, with a view
toward effectuating Congress's discerned intent").
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Finally, any interpretation of § 362(a) that hinders post-petition
suits to prevent a debtor's own unlawful conduct awards the debtor
far greater rights than those enjoyed by litigants outside of bank-
ruptcy, contravenes the favored, though not mandatory, Butner
rule.193 Once the automatic stay is used as "a sword to stop"1 94 a
court from enforcing its own orders, a debtor acquires an incompara-
ble ability to nullify and mock at least one tribunal's decisions by the
mere filing of a bankruptcy petition. Unlike so many other litigants,
the debtor may now render a court impotent in spite of recurrent acts
of attestable disobedience. 195 If vindicatory contempts are not exempt
by operation of § 362(b)(1), this unwelcome repercussion follows, re-
gardless of whether or not the stay is later lifted, without the conclu-
sive statutory authority traditionally required to justify such
construction of a Code section. 196 Per Butner and its descendants, as
such "direct guidance" 197 does not appear in § 362(a) and (b), this re-
sult should not be endorsed and a debtor should not be allowed to
exploit the Code so to protect himself or herself from the conse-
quences of contumacious behavior that "defies the public author-
ity"1 98 embodied by all courts, state and federal alike. Thusly seen,
the Butner rule reinforces the case for construing the adjective "crimi-
nal" in § 362(b)(1) to include a type of action-vindicatory con-
tempts-frequently considered quintessentially "criminal" with nary a
reference to federal common law. 199
193. Dominic's Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, 683 F.3d 757, 760-61 (6th Cir. 2012)
194. In re Synergy Dev. Corp., 140 B.R. 958, 959 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 840 F. Supp. 959, 966 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Johnson v.
Bednar, 573 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1991).
196. Bankruptcy, supra note 69, at 1068-76 (explaining why and how the Code depends on
state law but showing how the Code also expands and contracts state law rights).
197. In re Rigden, 795 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1986). A court, this opinion warns, should avoid
"any other construction of the Code" that "would give ... the debtor the perverse incentives to
enter or to resist bankruptcy solely to take advantage of or to avoid a substantive change in...
[its] rights" an interpretation rooted in Bunter. Id. at 736-37, 736 n.2, 737 n.4.
198. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947). Under federal law,
"[iun imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may properly take into consideration
the extent of the willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order, the seriousness of the conse-
quences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of effectively terminating the defendant's
defiance as required by the public interest, and the importance of deterring such acts in the
future." Id.; In re Solomon, 465 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing United States v. United
Mine Workers as articulating "[tihe proper standard by which the court is to determine the na-
ture and extent of criminal contempt sanctions.").
199. Such discomfort is understandable, as the Court has not been entirely successful in "of-
fering either an inclusive definition or a theory of federal common law." Jay Tidmarsh & Brian
J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 585, 589 (2006); accord Paul
Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 915 (1996). Notably, a federal
common law of bankruptcy does exist. Burtz v. Ganz (In re Mushroom Transp. Co.), 382 F.3d
325, 335 (3d Cir. 2004). Whether the classification of a vindicatory contempt as a "criminal
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B. Factors Relevant to Determining Whether A Contempt
Order is Vindicatory
To decide whether a contempt order is vindicatory, 200 a court must
consider all circumstances relevant to its issuance.201 If an order can
be so tagged, whether based on pre-Code authority, the Code's patent
objectives, or federal common law, 20 2 it should be held to be exempt
from § 362(a)(1). In general, courts agree on the germaneness of four
elements20 3 to the determination of whether a contempt "enforce[s]
the integrity of [a court's] orders," 20 4 vindicatory in essence regardless
of its initial taxonomy. 20 5
First, the events that prompted the contempt should be weighed. 20 6
If the sanction is directly attributable to a debtor's pre-petition diso-
bedience of a state court order,207 the contempt is "in the nature of a
fine imposed on [a debtor] as a result of his defiance of the court's
authority" and is one intended to vindicate the issuing court's author-
action or proceeding" falls within this recognized enclave is debatable, but not that it must be so
defined under a more general federal common law. See supra Part IV.A.1.
200. E.g., In re Knox, No. 12-20588, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5239, at *5, 2012 WL 5512034, at *2-3
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 2012) (collecting cases that "recognize an exception for civil contempt
proceedings when the purpose of the proceeding is to uphold the dignity of the court, not to
effectuate collection of a judgment"); Siskin v. Complete Aircraft Servs., Inc. (In re Siskin), 231
B.R. 514, 519 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[Alctions for civil contempt are considered private col-
lection devices and within the ambit of the automatic stay."); In re Martinez, 227 B.R. at 445
("[A]cts which are intended to uphold the dignity of the court and not simply collect a debt may
be excepted from the automatic stay under section 362(b)(1)." (quoting Chrusz v. Chrusz (In re
Chrusz), No. 95-11426-MWV, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1929, at *17-18, 1996 WL 1057950, at *6
(Bankr. D.N.H. July 10, 1996)).
201. In re Wiley, 315 B.R. 682, 684, 687 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2004); In re Rook, 102 B.R. 490, 493
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
202. See supra Part IV.A.
203. Often, these factors can be impossible to distinguish in practice. They do, however, ex-
press different concerns.
204. New England Med. Ctr. Hosps., Inc. v. PeproTech, Inc., No. 91-5584 (GEB), 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20657, at *8 n.2, 1996 WL 715525, at *3 n.2 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1996) (citing NLRB v.
Sawulski, 158 B.R. 971,977 (E.D. Mich. 1993); US Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Buscher, 89 B.R. 154,
156 (D. Kan. 1988); Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 524 F. Supp. 10, 11-12 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Guariglia
v. Cmty. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 382 F. Supp. 758, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)) (describing this ap-
proach as "particularly" appropriate "where . . . [a] debtor is not required as a result of the
contempt finding to pay any fine or penalty, nor to disgorge any sum").
205. See Kukui Gardens Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., 675 F Supp. 2d 1016, 1026-27 (D. Haw.
2009) ("To determine whether a civil contempt order is intended to collect on a judgment or to
uphold the dignity of a prior court order, the Court must examine the totality of the circum-
stances."); cf Dingley v. Yellow Express, LLC (In re Dingley), 514 B.R. 591, 598-99 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2014) (touching upon the differences between this "totality of circumstances test" and a
distinct favored bright-line variant).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, No. 7:08mc003, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50892, at *12-13,
2008 WL 2625359, at *3-4 (W.D. Va. June 30, 2008); In re Rook, 102 B.R. 490, 494 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1989); In re Clowser, 39 B.R. 883, 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
207. In re Dumas, 19 B.R. 676, 677-78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (summarizing prior case law).
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ity.20 8 Relevant facts include a debtor's failure to appear at court
hearings, a demonstrable link between a debtor's conduct and the
sanctions assessed in the order, or a debtor's repeated failures to cor-
rect misrepresentations or explain legally significant mistakes despite
being offered an opportunity to do so. Conversely, the order is not a
"coercive tool to enforce a judgment" 20 9 or a circumvented means of
achieving such a verboten end,210 for such features evidence its civil
nature. If a contempt has both civil and criminal characteristics, the
criminal aspect is considered dominant.21'
Second, the procedural maneuvers preceding the contempt's re-
lease, including all orders previously made, all motions recently filed,
and all hearing once held, matter greatly. If a court issues definite and
specific orders that a debtor disobeys, the contempt is not directed at
a single deed but instead represents a court's last punishment for a
debtor's willful and continuing defiance of its jurisdictionally indubita-
ble authority.212 This conclusion is strengthened if the earlier order
has a purgation condition, one that a debtor chooses not to fulfill and
to utterly ignore. 213 The order is cinched if the contempt itself as-
sesses "a flat, unconditional fine totaling even as little as $50 an-
nounced after a finding of contempt" and leaves a party with "no
208. FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. 96-35529, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 757, at *11
(9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997); see, e.g., In re Long, 318 F. App'x 891, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining
how In re Bloom, 875 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1989), narrowed David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d
412 (9th Cir. 1977), the latter of which was decided prior to the enactment of § 362(a)); Scully v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 489 N.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Iowa 1992); In re Thayer, 24 B.R. 491, 492-93 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1982); cf. Berg v. Good Samaritan Hosp. (In re Berg), 230 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir.
2000) (noting that most courts have concluded that sanctions for attorney misconduct are not
subject to the automatic stay).
209. Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 910-11 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008); see
also, e.g., In re Morgan, 109 B.R. 297, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989).
210. Guariglia, 382 F. Supp. at 761; see also, e.g., Stovall v. Stovalt, 126 B.R. 814, 815 (N.D.
Ga. 1990).
211. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 638, n.10 (1987) (quoting Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33,
42-43 (1941)); see also, e.g., Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 591 (1947) ("Where a
judgment of contempt is embodied in a single order which contains an admixture of criminal and
civil elements, the criminal aspect of the order fixes its character for purposes of procedure on
review.").
212. See Go-Video v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. (In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Re-
corder Antitrust Litig.), 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993) (enumerating the various factors rele-
vant to a finding of contempt).
213. See Lowery v. McIlroy & Millian (In re Lowery), 292 B.R. 645, 650 (E.D. Mo. 2003)
(conceding that "[a] purging option contained in a contempt order maybe evidence that the
citation is an attempt to coerce payment of a pre-petition debt" but that "[t]he existence of a
purging option ... does not result in a per se finding that the contempt order is an attempt to
coerce pre-petition debt"); In re Maloney, 204 B.R. 671, 674 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("A con-
tempt order that, on the other hand, incarcerates a party for a definite period of time or imposes
another penalty, without any provision for purge of the contempt, does not serve to redress a
private right and is considered a criminal contempt order." (emphasis added)).
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subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compli-
ance. '214 Such factors mark the contempt as indelibly "punitive," is-
sued "to uphold the dignity of the court. '215 On the other hand, if the
order allows for an indefinite sentence and still permits a debtor to
purge it in full, it mirrors the archetypical civil contempt.216
Third, the procedural protections the issuing court actually provides
or denies warrant emphasis. If the state court awards a debtor a num-
ber of procedural prerogatives normally reserved for criminal matters,
such treatment implies the contempt is criminal . 17 For criminal con-
tempts, a party is owed distinct procedural protections per the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 218 protections whose
minimum is set by the Constitution but that will otherwise be state-
specific and defined by statute or rule in a state court.219 Thus, when
"a [s]tate's proceedings are involved, state law provides strong gui-
dance about whether or not the [s]tate is exercising its authority in a
non-punitive, noncriminal manner. ' 220 Generally, for a court to sanc-
tion a party for criminal contempt, that party is informed of the accu-
sation, allowed to show cause why sanctions are not merited, and
given a chance to present evidence or explain mitigating circum-
stances. 221 The Court draws a distinction between "petty and serious
214. Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994) (quoting Penfield Co. of Cal. v SEC, 330
U.S. at 590 (1947)); accord, e.g., Capitalsource Fin., LLC v. Delco Oil, Inc., No. DKC 06-2706,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98105, at *17, 2010 WL 3733934, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2010) ("A court
may impose sanctions for civil contempt to coerce obedience to a court order or to compensate
the complainant for losses sustained as a result of violation of a court order." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Moon v. Moon (In re Moon), 201 B.R. 79, 85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[A]
contempt order, whether denominated as civil or criminal, which incarcerates a party for some
period of time for some contumacy without leave or compulsion to purge the contempt by doing
something... does not fall within the scope of the statute."). A number of cases, the court in In
re Moon explained, are "generally consistent" with in "in result, if not analysis." Id. (citing In re
Rook, 102 B.R. 490 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); Kearns v. Orr (In re Kearns), 168 B.R. 423 (D. Kan.
1994); In re Newman, 196 B.R. 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
215. In re Wiley, 315 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2004).
216. In re Burgess, 503 B.R. 154, 158 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014).
217. At the very least, such safeguards would lay to rest any due process objection. In fact, if
they were not provided, it may be improper to treat the order as criminal even if it appears
vindicatory. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838; cf. Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S.
272, 277 (2010) (rejecting the contention that a criminal contempt prosecution is a "private ac-
tion" and not a "public action").
218. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011); see also Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John
Labatt Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427, 1433-36 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (discussing the different due process
requirements). In federal court, many of the procedural protections applicable to criminal con-
tempt proceedings appear in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
219. E.g., Delgado v. Souders, 46 P.3d 729, 741-42 (Or. 1999): Tschapek v. Frailing, 699 So. 2d
851, 853-54 (Fla. 1997).
220. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838.
221. E.g., Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 575 (7th Cir. 1998) ("In cases of both civil
and criminal contempt, the trial court is required to give the contemnor notice which allows
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contempt fines," the latter triggering a right to a jury trial and essen-
tially criminal.222 What distinguishes a "serious" fine from a "petty"
one, though, is still debated.223
Finally, a proper characterization of a contempt as civil or criminal
hinges on the order's "primary purpose. 224 If even one of the objec-
tives of that proceeding is "to uphold the [c]ourt's dignity," the con-
tempt is vindicatory. 225  "[T]he appearance of criminally
contumacious conduct" clings to a debtor's "previous behavior" 226 de-
pending on "the extent of [his] willful and deliberate defiance of [a]
court's order[s]. '227 The order cannot be a punishment for a debtor's
failure to pay a civil judgment. 228 Nor is it "one calculated to enforce
a money judgment, or to harass" a debtor. 22 9 If it is targeted at pun-
adequate time to prepare a defense." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Showalter v.
Brubaker, 650 N.E.2d 693, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)); Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546
1553 (l1th Cir. 1988) (interpreting the procedure for subjecting persons to a criminal contempt
citation encoded in 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982)); Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1304 n.4 (11th Cir.
1982) (summarizing the procedures required by FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.480).
222. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837 n.5, 838.
223. F.J. Hanshaw Enters. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1138-39, 1139 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., 1st Tech., LLC v. Rational Enters. Ltda., No. 2:06-cv-01110-RLH-GWF,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106100, at *19, 2008 WL 4571057, at 6 (D. Nev. July 29, 2008).
224. United States v. Puente, 524 F. App'x 119, 121 (5th Cir. 2013); Rollins v. Campbell (In re
Rollins), 200 B.R. 427, 440 n.24 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996), rev'd, 243 B.R. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1997); In
re Hotte-Buckallew, 172 B.R. 927, 932-33 (Bankr. W.D Mo. 1994).
225. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. CN Prods., Inc., 272 B.R. 879, 881-82 (E.D. Va. 2002); Port
v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1985).
226. Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 524 F. Supp. 10, 12 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see also In re Rudlaw/
Empirical Software Prods., Ltd., 83 B.R. 241, 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The automatic stay
... may not be used as a shield to sanction contumacious conduct in violation of a prepetition
order enjoining a debtor from violating a party's property rights."); In re Cohoes Indus. Termi-
nal, Inc., 62 B.R. 369, 378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[A] state court prepetition order... may be
enforced by contempt proceedings against the debtor and its officers in order to vindicate the
dignity of the state court without violating the automatic stay.").
227. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-03 (1947); United States v.
Lach, 874 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 302-03).
228. In re Morgan, 109 B.R. 297, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989); Guariglia v. Cmty. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 382 F. Supp. 758, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
229. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Szymanczyk, No. 92 C 6027, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 900, at *15
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1995); see also, e.g., Kukui Gardens Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., 675 F. Supp.
2d 1016, 1026-27 (D. Haw. 2009) (concluding, based on its own review of the existing case law,
that "contempt proceedings intended to effectuate collection of a judgment" are not stayed);
Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 910-11 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008); In re Lin-
coln, 264 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) ("[I]f the underlying purpose in continuing the
contempt action is calculated to enforce a money judgment, pursue a collection motive, or to
harass a defendant, then relief from the stay is not appropriate." (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re ABC Repairs & Servs., Inc., No. 89-1819-D H, 1990 Bankr.
LEXIS 3020, at *7, 1990 WL 10593987, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Mar. 8, 1990) (adopting the
position that "[a] court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order
of contempt to determine . . .the intent of the Court or the creditor seeking the order of
contempt").
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ishing a debtor for "flout[ing] the judicial system and ignor[ing] his
obligations, '230 however, and not coercing compliance with prior or-
ders,231 the contempt's aim is "to compel [the debtor's] respect for
court orders" 232 and "to punish . . . and [therefore] vindicate the
court's authority. '233 If so meant, the order is chiefly "criminal. '234
V. CONCLUSION
Intended to uphold a court's dignity, vindicatory contempts are
criminal in nature and should be enforced post-petition. As this arti-
cle demonstrates, imperfect underpinnings deprive the three popular
approaches to construing these contempts of much of their persuasive
value. Even so, an exemption from § 362(a)'s prohibition for these
orders is grounded in the malleable definition of "criminal" in
§ 362(b)(1) or in the pre-Code custom excepting these special orders
from statutory obviation. Because this understanding of state courts'
powers is not unambiguously overridden by the Code, § 362(a) should
not be construed so as to impede this venerable authority's exercise.
The statutory text, contextually explored, compels such a construc-
tion, as does a potent equitable principle:235 "A debtor should not be
permitted to use bankruptcy to protect himself from the consequences
of contumacious behavior. ' 236 Whichever justification is favored, the
same four factors-the underlying facts, the procedural background,
the safeguards afforded by the issuing court, and the order's primary
purpose-will always merit examination. At its most basic, with so
230. Forsberg v. Pefanis, No. 1:07-cv-03116-JOF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55297, at *3, 2010 WL
2331465, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2010); see also, e.g., Summit Fin. Res., L.P. v. Walthers Oil Co.,
No. 2:07-CV-949 TS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4086, at *5, 2008 WL 183380, at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 17,
2008).
231. Asseo ex rel. NLRB v. Bultman Enters., 951 F. Supp. 307, 312 (D.P.R. 1996) ; see also,
e.g. Wilson v. Abell (In re Abell), No. 13-13847-PM, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1725, at *6 (Bankr. D.
Md. Apr. 26, 2013); In re ABC Repairs & Servs., Inc., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 3020, at *7, 1990 WL
10593987, at *3.
232. In re Wiley, 315 B.R. 682, 690 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2004).
233. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 159 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 1998); see also
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04 (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 441 (1911)).
234. Ingalls v. Thompson (In re Bradley), 588 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lamar
Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also, e.g., Duby v. United States (In
re Duby), 451 B.R. 664, 670 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
702 F.2d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 1983).
235. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION 11 (1999) (referring to the theory of "equitable interpretation" and hold-
ing a statute's "spirit" to be its equity, which in turn requires an investigation into that statute's
objective and other substantive background considerations).
236. In re Burgess, 503 B.R. 154, 157 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014).
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many contempts "partak[ing] of the characteristics of both, '2 37
whether an order is adjudged vindicatory and criminal or punitive and
civil will ever be a circumstantial question, its resolution turning on a
tale's cogency and a narrator's agility.
237. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904); see also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Nickolaou, No. 99 C 6425, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11561, at *24-25, 2000 WL
1029622, at *7 (N.D. I11. July 26, 2000) (noting that "[t]he distinction between civil and criminal
contempt can be quite 'elusive"' (quoting Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829-31 (1994))).
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